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Response to Technovation Editor’s comments: 
 
(1) 14 cases and 35 interviews - why these specific numbers - presumably some of it 
is convenience, but I imagine triangulation, saturation, coverage of a range of 
industries and other factors also played a part. Could you add a few lines on this. 
Agreed. The following explanation has been added (Page 11): 
“We relied on several data sources: observations, interviews, and archival data 
such as internal documents, annual reports, websites, and news articles in order 
to triangulate the data and so improve the accuracy of the picture emerging (Jick, 
1979). We aimed to analyse a sufficient number of case studies and range of 
industries to be fairly confident that the results had some general applicability 
while limiting the sample so as to enable in-depth interviews within a tractable 
timescale. Based on these considerations we targeted completion of 12-15 case 
studies. By the end of the research programme we were successful in conducting 
two rounds of interviews across 14 companies (detailed in Table 1). The first 
round of interviews was conducted between March 2010 and January 2011 and 
a second round between June 2011 and September 2011. The second round of 
interviews complemented the first by asking follow-up and clarification 
questions. In some cases were we were able to secure interviews with multiple 
individuals; here we tried to gain perspectives from employees drawn from 
different levels in the corporate hierarchy or multiple business units, making a 
total of 35 semi-structured interviews.” 
(2) The seminal reference for Disruptive is Research Policy paper by Abernathy and 
Clark. Could you please give them the credit that is due. I fear that Christensen's 
work is a bit overstressed and they have been left out completely. 
Agreed. The following has been revised (Page 1): 
“Disruptive innovation theory has long been studied in the innovation 
management literature (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Adner, 2002, 2006; Calia, 
Guerrini, & Moura, 2007; Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006; Hall, 
Matos, & Martin, 2014; Kassicieh, Kirchhoff, Walsh, & McWhorter, 2002; Linton, 
2002, 2004, 2009). The concept goes back at least to the seminal work by 
Abernathy and Clark (1985), who suggested that disruptive innovations often 
destroyed the value of existing technical competencies. This idea was elaborated 
by Christensen (1997), again with a focus on technological innovation.” 
 
Detailed response to reviewers
The following paper has also been added to the reference list: 
Abernathy, W., & Clark, K. B. 1985. Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative 
destruction. Research Policy, 14(1): 3-22. 
(3) Further development of managerial implications could add to your paper. If 
you think about this for 15 minutes, I believe you will agree with me. It is likely to 
really strengthen your papers impact in the future. 
Agreed. The following implications have been added (Page 27-29): 
“Our findings also have a number of managerial implications. First, they 
underline the need for managers need to be alert to the fact that disruptive 
innovation can stem from a much broader set of sources than breakthrough 
technologies alone. In particular, some of the innovations that are potentially 
most disruptive to incumbents with legacy products, processes and assets have 
their antecedents in new processes for R&D, product design and production as 
well as in market conditions that encourage and facilitate the development of 
innovative business models. This argues for taking a broad view of where the 
opportunities and threats from disruptive innovation may emanate. It also 
suggests that when considering how resource allocation and organisation 
structure, culture, and incentives can be adjusted to increase the likelihood of 
successful disruptive innovation arising, managers need to assess how these 
variables influence broad spectrum of types of innovation, not just traditional 
R&D activities. 
 Second, our results suggest that there is a growing possibility that disruptive 
innovations will arise in emerging markets such as China. Emerging markets 
appear to provide a particularly fertile environment both for opportunities for 
disruptive innovation to arise and for this potential to be realised by proactive 
entrepreneurs. In part, this reflects that fact that innovative product designs and 
business models that offer a step-change improvement in value for money are 
required to unlock latent mass-market demand in these economies. It also 
reflects the need for innovation in R&D, design and production processes in 
order to benefit from local factor conditions such as the availability of low-cost, 
but less skilled labour, less legacy assets, and the presence of many first-time 
consumers with a desire for experimentation. Moreover, as global market 
growth is increasingly driven by consumers located in developing economies 
and the “value-for-money” segments in developed economies, this means that, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, incumbents in the developed world may need to 
look to emerging economies such as China to find some of the keys to delivering 
the kinds of innovation that will allow their companies to thrive and prosper in 
the next round of global competition. In response, managers will need to find 
better ways to tap into the antecedents of disruptive innovation in emerging 
economies such as China. This will probably require that R&D units in emerging 
markets be tasked with seeking out opportunities for disruptive innovation and 
realising them locally, rather than focusing on limited adaptation of imported 
product designs. An alternative approach may be to develop alliances with 
emerging market players in order to tap into local know-how and a conducive 
environment for disruptive innovation. This last approach might be particularly 
attractive to small- and medium-sized foreign companies that face financial, 
regulatory and knowledge barriers to commercialising potentially disruptive 
innovations at home. 
Third, our results suggest that incumbent firms exposed to disruptive innovation 
may need to re-engineer their existing R&D and innovation approaches to create 
new processes. This would involve adopting process changes such as 
industrialising R&D, pushing the boundaries of parallel processing, modularising 
product development and pragmatic and rapid decision making in the 
innovation cycle described in this paper. Even when these can run effectively in 
parallel with established procedures, however, the barrier to unlearning existing 
approaches to innovation may need to be overcome to achieve this kind of 
change.” 
(4) A lazy reader who is in a hurry could think that this paper is about China. The 
message also relates to other economies - can you make this clear - what types of 
economies are like this and why? (For example are African firms use of mobile 
telephony another example of this?) 
Agreed. To make this clearer we have changed the title to: 
“Antecedents and Implications of Disruptive Innovation: Evidence from China” 
The following explanation has been added (Page 2): 
“At the same time, a growing body of evidence suggests that emerging economies 
are becoming an important source of disruptive innovation (Hart & Christensen, 
2002; Li, 2013). Emerging market environments can stimulate disruptive 
innovation because changes to product design and business models that 
drastically lower costs and improve value for money are often a prerequisite for 
unlocking mass-market segments of customers with limited disposable income 
in these economies. Large numbers of first-time consumers with less established 
preferences and expectations, less regulation, and fewer legacy assets may also 
mean it is possible to launch, test and improve disruptive innovations more 
rapidly and cheaply than in developed markets (Williamson, Ramamurti, Fleury 
& Fleury, 2013). These conditions have given rise to successful disruptive 
innovations such as the India company Bharti Airtel’s disruptive business model 
for mobile telecommunications incorporating innovative marketing, pricing and 
billing systems specially adapted to appeal to low-income consumers that 
allowed the company to revolutionise market in 20 countries across Africa and 
Asia. Likewise Brazil has been a leading source of disruptive innovation in 
sustainable biofuels using flexible-fuel vehicles that now accounts for some 35% 
of the total Brazilian transport fuel market and has begun to be applied in Africa 
and Asia (Angelo, 2012). 
Arguably the predominate source of disruptive innovations among emerging 
markets, however, has been China where examples span a wide variety of 
industries from medical diagnostic equipment and lithium-ion batteries through 
to innovative business models for e-commerce and social media portals 
(Williamson & Yin, 2013). With the aim of better understanding how new R&D 
and production process innovations can act as antecedents for disruptive 
innovation in this paper, therefore, we have chosen to analyse a set of case 
studies of Chinese firms pursuing potentially disruptive innovation and then to 
explore some of the implications of these innovations for incumbent competitors 
from the developed markets.” 
(5) You offer a table with some examples of the case studies. As you only have 14 
cases (a manageable number), it would be nice if you could add the rest of the cases 
to the table. This may take a page of journal text, but is worth it.  
Agreed. Table 1 has been revised to list the 14 case studies as follows: 
Table 1: Case Studies of Disruptive Innovation from China 
 
R&D and 
production process 
innovations 
Disruptive Impact Case firms Results 
Industrialising the 
R&D process 
Providing adequate 
functionality, rapid 
installation, higher levels of 
customization, sooner than 
incumbents and at lower 
prices.  
Huawei 
 
 
 
 
 
Wuxi 
AppTech 
 
 
Yichen JCG 
Science & 
Technology 
Dev. Co 
 
Guangdong 
Cranes 
Corp. 
(1) Founded in 1987 as a 
distributor of imported 
telecoms products 
(2) Now the largest 
telecommunications 
equipment maker in the world 
(1) Founded in 2000 
(2) One of the largest open-
platforms for pharmaceutical 
R&D 
(1) Founded 1995 
(2) Networking (Ethernet and 
wireless) product 
manufacturer 
 
 
(1) Founded in 1961 
(2) Major manufacturer of 
cranes and port machinery 
Parallel processing 
in R&D 
Reducing the total time and 
cost required to develop a 
product that offers greater 
value for money to 
consumers. 
Lenovo 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearl River 
 
 
Mindray 
(1) Founded in 1984 as a 
reseller, distributor for 
foreign brands  
(2) Now the world's second-
largest personal computer 
vendor by unit sales 
(1) Founded in 1956 
(2) Now the world's largest 
piano maker 
(1) Founded in 1991 
(2) A leading developer and 
manufacturer of medical 
devices worldwide 
Modularising 
product 
development 
Reducing the total time and 
cost required to develop a 
product that offers greater 
value for money to consumers 
by speeding up the rate at 
which multiple aspects of the 
product can be improved.  
Tianyu 
  
Jinli Group 
 
 
 
 
SIM 
Technology 
(1) Both started as an OEM or 
a distributor channel for 
leading brands 
(2) Shanzhai products by 
these and other firms are 
ranked second in the Chinese 
mobile phone sector with 
16.1% market share in 2012 
(1) Listed on the Hong Kong 
Group 
 
 
 
Tencent 
 
 
Broad 
Group 
Stock Exchange in 2005 
(2) Leading mobile 
communication and “Internet 
of Things” developer in China 
(1) Founded 1998 
(2) China’s leading social 
media and Internet portal 
(1) Founded 1988 
(2) Designer and 
manufacturer of non-electric 
air conditioning systems and 
modular, sustainable 
buildings with installations in 
over 80 countries 
 
 
 
Pragmatic decision 
making in the R&D 
process  
Reducing the total time and 
cost required to develop a 
product that offers greater 
value for money to consumers 
by facilitating the 
development and 
implementation of cost, 
application and business 
model innovation.  
Tianyu 
 
Jinli Group 
 
 
 
 
 
Wide 
Industrial 
Group 
 
 
Alibaba 
Group 
(1) Both started as an OEM or 
a distributor channel for 
leading brands 
(2) Shanzhai products by 
these and other firms now 
ranked second in the Chinese 
mobile phone sector with 
16.1% market share in 2012 
(1) Founded in 1997 
(2) Research, design and 
manufacture of commercial 
air conditioning 
 
(1) (1) Founded 1999 
(2) (2) China’s largest e-
commerce company 
 
 
Thank you again for your helpful suggestions. We hope these revisions have 
substantively addressed them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Disruptive innovation theory has long been studied in the innovation management 
literature (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Adner, 2002, 2006; Calia, Guerrini, & Moura, 2007; 
Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Danneels, 
2004; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006; Hall, Matos, & Martin, 2014; Kassicieh, Kirchhoff, 
Walsh, & McWhorter, 2002; Linton, 2002, 2004, 2009). The concept goes back at least to the 
seminal work by Abernathy and Clark (1985), who suggested that disruptive innovations 
often destroyed the value of existing technical competencies. This idea was elaborated by 
Christensen (1997), again with a focus on technological innovation. Over years, the concept 
of disruptive innovation widened to include not only technologies but also products and 
business models (Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Markides, 2006, 2012). 
For example, Christensen and Raynor (2003) suggest that disruptive innovations include 
discount department stores; low-price, point-to-point airlines; cheap, mass-market products 
such as power tools, copiers, and motorcycles; and online businesses such as bookselling, 
education, brokerage, and travel agents.  
The growing recognition of disruptive innovation as an important phenomenon in 
competitive strategy has led researchers to examine the question of how disruptive innovation 
comes about. A substantial body of literature has explored the conditions under which 
disruptive innovation is likely to arise from an organisation, including its resource allocation 
processes (Chao & Kavadias, 2007; Hogan, 2005; Nelson & Winter, 1982); its organisational 
structure (Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Lee & Chen, 2009; Tsai & Wang, 2005); and its 
organisational culture (Henderson, 2006; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002). Despite the progress, 
the nature of the innovation processes that enable disruptive innovation deserves further 
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examination (Yu & Hang, 2010). In particular, our understanding of what kinds of R&D and 
opportunity discovery and creation processes are likely to give rise to disruptive innovation is 
limited.  
At the same time, a growing body of evidence suggests that emerging economies are 
becoming an important source of disruptive innovation (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Li, 2013). 
Emerging market environments can stimulate disruptive innovation because changes to 
product design and business models that drastically lower costs and improve value for money 
are often a prerequisite for unlocking mass-market segments of customers with limited 
disposable income in these economies. Large numbers of first-time consumers with less 
established preferences and expectations, less regulation, and fewer legacy assets may also 
mean it is possible to launch, test and improve disruptive innovations more rapidly and 
cheaply than in developed markets (Williamson, Ramamurti, Fleury & Fleury, 2013). These 
conditions have given rise to successful disruptive innovations such as the India company 
Bharti Airtel’s disruptive business model for mobile telecommunications incorporating 
innovative marketing, pricing and billing systems specially adapted to appeal to low-income 
consumers that allowed the company to revolutionise market in 20 countries across Africa 
and Asia. Likewise Brazil has been a leading source of disruptive innovation in sustainable 
biofuels using flexible-fuel vehicles that now accounts for some 35% of the total Brazilian 
transport fuel market and has begun to be applied in Africa and Asia (Angelo, 2012). 
Arguably the predominate source of disruptive innovations among emerging markets, 
however, has been China where examples span a wide variety of industries from medical 
diagnostic equipment and lithium-ion batteries through to innovative business models for e-
commerce and social media portals (Williamson & Yin, 2013). With the aim of better 
understanding how new R&D and production process innovations can act as antecedents for 
disruptive innovation in this paper, therefore, we have chosen to analyse a set of case studies 
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of Chinese firms pursuing potentially disruptive innovation and then to explore some of the 
implications of these innovations for incumbent competitors from the developed markets. 
This analysis bears on one of the main themes of this Special Issue: the sources of 
innovation opportunities; in particular, the debate on whether opportunities are discovered or 
created by entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000), especially in the area of disruptive innovation. It has been argued that 
opportunities for innovation are often created by changes in technology, demographics, and 
geographic distribution of markets for innovations (Hang & Garnsey, 2011). Emerging 
economies can provide a particularly conducive environment for innovation opportunities to 
arise because they often act as a crucible where new customers with fluid needs and 
behaviours, a growing number of competitors, a flexible business and institutional context 
and newly introduced technologies come together. In the context of this debate we certainly 
find that China’s fast-changing environment throws up many opportunities for disruptive 
innovation. But while emerging economies such as China provide a fertile environment for 
opportunity discovery, we also find that realising these opportunities requires very proactive 
initiatives by entrepreneurs. This is at variance with Alvarez & Barney’s (2007) 
characterisation of discovery opportunities as arising independently of the actions of those 
discovering them. Instead, we observe that many disruptive innovations in China have their 
antecedents in the actions of entrepreneurs who re-engineer traditional R&D and innovation 
processes to deliver disruptive innovations. In this sense, entrepreneurs are proactively 
creating much of the disruptive innovation in China. 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by examining the existing literature on 
theories of disruptive innovation. This leads us to identify a gap in our existing understanding 
about how changing innovation processes might give rise to disruptive innovation and some 
broad conjectures about what kinds of R&D and innovation processes might promote 
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disruptive innovation. The next section on methods and data explains the case study 
methodology we deploy to explore these issues and conjectures and how data were collected 
and analysed to develop a set of propositions about the antecedents of disruptive innovation. 
We then report findings from the case studies of Chinese firms, and followed by a discussion 
of the implications for the changing nature of global competition. We conclude by outlining 
the possible contributions of the present study to existing theory and practice and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theory of disruptive innovation provides the context for interpreting the empirical 
results and theoretical contributions of this study. In this section we first review the disruptive 
innovation theory. We then examine new approaches of disruptive innovations that Chinese 
firms have developed. This leads us to identify a gap in the literature which gives rise to the 
research question addressed in the remainder of this paper: What are the antecedents of 
disruptive innovation currently emerging in China? 
 
Theoretical insights into disruptive innovation  
Christensen (1997) first comprehensively examined the concept of disruptive 
innovation in his seminal book titled The Innovator's Dilemma. According to Christensen, 
disruptive technologies are technologies that provide different values from mainstream 
technologies and are initially inferior to mainstream technologies along the dimensions of 
performance that are most important to mainstream customers. In its early development stage, 
each product based on a certain disruptive technology could only serve niche segments that 
value its non-standard performance attributes. Subsequently, further development could 
improve the performance of the disruptive technology to a level sufficient to satisfy 
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mainstream customers by focusing solely on key attributes. This was often possible because 
the performance of the mainstream technology may have already exceeded the demand of 
mainstream customers, resulting in 'performance overshoot' with over-served customers. 
Market disruption then occurs when, despite its inferior performance on focal attributes 
valued by existing customers, the new product displaces the mainstream product in the 
mainstream market. According to Christensen (1997) there are two preconditions for such a 
market disruption to occur: there is performance overshoot on the mainstream attributes of 
the existing product, and there are asymmetric incentives between an existing healthy 
business model and the potentially disruptive business model. Christensen documented these 
processes in numerous contexts including hard disk drives, earthmoving equipment and 
motor controls.  
In The Innovator's Solution (Christensen & Raynor, 2003) the authors proposed that 
the innovator's dilemma could be resolved by well-managed incumbent firms if they 
developed their own disruptive technologies within their sustaining competitive paradigms. 
By adopting this strategy they could avoid their own dethronement. Interestingly for our 
current purpose, however, in this second book the authors replaced the term “disruptive 
technology” with a new term “disruptive innovation”, suggesting the application of the theory 
could be broadened to include not only technological products, but also services and business 
models innovation, such as discount department stores, low-price, point-to-point airlines and 
online businesses education. Christensen (2006) admitted that he had been mistaken to equate 
the phenomenon of disruptive innovation with a disruptive technology in The Innovator's 
Dilemma. Disruptive innovation does not only arise from new technologies that surpass the 
performance of the existing technologies dominant in a market. Disruptive innovation may 
also arise from changes in the business model or underlying processes that enable superior or 
novel value to be delivered to consumers.  
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Taking this idea further, Markides (2006) classifies disruptive innovations into three 
different types: technological, business model, and radical product innovations. All of these 
different types of disruptive innovations may follow a similar process to invade existing 
markets and may have equally disruptive effects on incumbent firms. But Markides argued 
that a disruptive technological innovation is a fundamentally different phenomenon from a 
disruptive business-model innovation or a disruptive product innovation: These innovations 
arise in different ways, have different competitive effects, and require different responses 
from incumbents. To distinguish disruptive innovation from other types of innovations, 
Markides (2012) proposed two criteria: First, a disruptive innovation must start out as inferior 
in terms of the performance that existing customers expect, but be superior in terms of price; 
Second, it must evolve so as to become "good enough" in performance while at the same time 
remaining superior in price. These criteria reflect the idea that a disruptive innovation 
challenges the established value propositions and business models of incumbents. 
It is worth emphasising that one of the key insights from this analysis is that 
innovations do not need to need to embody radical advances in either technology or product 
functionality in order to be disruptive. In fact, many innovations that might otherwise be 
described as “imitative” (Huang, Chou & Lee, 2010) can be disruptive because they 
challenge the existing value propositions and business models in the market. 
Building on these insights, Yin and Williamson (2009) studied different types of 
innovations introduced by Chinese firms that had proven to be disruptive in the market. They 
found that these innovations commonly fell into three categories within their samples. First 
was “cost innovation”: reengineering the cost structure in novel ways to offer customers 
adequate quality and similar or higher value for less cost (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). Second 
was “application innovation”: finding innovative applications for existing technologies or 
products (Yu & Hang, 2011). Third was “business model innovation”: the well-worn idea of 
   
 
 
7 
changing one of the four core components of the business model (customer value proposition, 
profit formula, key resources or new processes) but with a twist - adjusting those aspects that 
can be changed quickly and at minimal cost. All of these three types of innovation can be 
considered disruptive in the sense that they attack performance overshoots on the mainstream 
attributes of an existing product while also creating asymmetric incentives between 
incumbents’ existing business models and the new business model. 
 
Enabling potential disruptive innovation 
Building on the research that established the concept of disruptive innovation and 
developed a more complete typology of disruptive innovations, a substantial body of 
literature has elaborated on how organizations enable disruptive innovation. The explanations 
can be divided into three sets of pre-conditions: resource allocation; organizational structure; 
and organizational culture. 
First, resource allocation has been shown to influence a firm's capability for disruptive 
innovation. Firms often fail to embrace disruptive innovation because of resource dependence. 
For example, their leaders become locked into perpetuating businesses in which they have 
accumulated resources and or they fail to see the need for innovation because they listen to 
their current customers (Christensen, 2006). Firms also tend to invest more in established 
businesses that already have scale and perceived advantage (Yu & Hang, 2010). 
Consequently when facing the competition from rivals, they often respond by making 
investments aimed at improving the established technologies used by their current customers, 
thus missing the opportunities for disruptive innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
To enable disruptive innovation, Christensen and Raynor (2003) suggest that an 
additional team at the corporate level is required to be specifically responsible for collecting 
disruptive innovation ideas and realising them in practice. Moreover, given the uncertainties 
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surrounding disruptive innovations, long-term-oriented, subjective-based incentive plans 
should be adopted instead of short-term-oriented, formula-based incentive plans for key 
executives (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006), so that the senior managers will not be confined 
by rigid incentives (such as market size, growth rate, profitability). Empirical research also 
suggests that resource allocation processes using strategic buckets to manage sustaining 
versus disruptive projects independently are more effective in allowing disruptive innovation 
to flourish (Chao & Kavadias, 2007; Hogan, 2005). Companies should allocate financial and 
human resources to identify new potential customers, construct relationships with these 
customers, and develop knowledge about them (Danneels, 2002, 2003, 2004), because it is 
the emerging segments that value disruptive innovations at the time of their introduction 
(Govindarajan, Kopalle, & Danneels, 2011). 
Second, organizational structure has been found to influence the probability of 
disruptive innovation. Both case studies and surveys in high-tech industries have shown that 
the size of the firm is negatively correlated to the success of disruptive innovation 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002). The implication is that a large 
corporation wishing to promote disruptive innovation should attempt to foster flexibility by 
having smaller business units. New start-ups, meanwhile, are frequently found to be 
relatively fertile ground for disruptive innovation, but lack complementary assets that are 
often critical to develop potentially disruptive ideas, while the necessary complementary 
assets are captive within incumbent leaders (Rothaermel, 2001). Collaboration between 
incumbent firms and start-ups, therefore, can facilitate potential disruptive innovation. The 
creation of separate organizational units can also foster the development of disruptive 
innovations because developing disruptive innovations may require new processes and new 
routines, and the creation of autonomous units will help to break from current routines and 
processes (Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
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Finally, a firm's culture has also been identified as a critical precondition for the 
emergence of disruptive innovation. Firm culture refers to a core set of attitudes and practices 
that are shared by the members of the firm (Detert, Schroeder, & Mauriel, 2000; Martin, 2002; 
Schultz & Hatch, 1996). It is an effective way of controlling and co-ordinating people 
without elaborate and rigid formal control systems (Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002). A culture 
that fosters relentless innovation may help the firm to stay constantly at the leading edge of 
innovation (Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009). However, culture is a double-edged sword that 
may also lead to the failure of innovation (Yu & Hang, 2010). This is because cultural inertia 
is a key reason why managers often fail to introduce change and innovation, even when they 
know that it is needed (Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Henderson, 2006).  
To promote disruptive innovation existing research suggests that it is important for 
incumbents to prepare for and institute organizational change and unlearn deeply entrenched 
values at the advent of potential disruptive innovation. Unlearning is defined as the process 
by which people and firms eliminate old logic and substitute it with something fundamentally 
new ( McGill & Slocum, 1993; Baker & Sinkula, 2002; Sinkula, 2002). The ability to unlearn 
is one of the most critical competencies people require to overcome pre-judgement and 
obsolete mental models that otherwise act as key barriers to disruptive innovation (Assink, 
2006; Ferriani, Garnsey, & Lorenzoni, 2012). This unlearning is especially critical for 
successful incumbents (compared with latecomers or newcomers), because they often find it 
difficult to abandon business models, R&D and design strategies and other processes that 
have worked well in building their current market positions. On the other hand, elements of 
culture such as entrepreneurship, risk-taking, flexibility and creativity, need to be instilled, 
preserved and valued in order to develop disruptive innovations (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 
2006). It is also argued that an adhocracy culture works better to promote the development of 
disruptive innovations at an organization than a clan culture, in which loyalty, tradition, and 
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emphasis on internal maintenance could lead to a lack of attention to changing market needs 
(Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993).  
All of these findings can help guide the management of firms to create the right pre-
conditions for disruptive innovation to emerge. However, this extant literature on how R&D 
and production process innovations impact the extent of disruptive innovation even when 
preconditions are favourable is scarce. Notable exceptions are the work by Linton (2004) and 
Yu and Hang (2011), who explained how to create technology candidates that could facilitate 
disruptive innovation in due course. Drawing on the evidence from Chinese firms, we hope to 
further contribute to filling this gap by exploring new process innovations that can enable 
firms to promote, and then deliver on, opportunities for disruptive innovation in the context 
of China. By doing so we also hope to shed further light on the debate as to whether 
disruptive innovation opportunities are discovered or created. 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 As we have already noted, evidence suggests that China is becoming an important 
source of disruptive innovation (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Li, 2013; Williamson & Yin, 
2013). Existing research also suggests a number of factors that encourage Chinese firms to 
focus on disruptive innovation including a lower number of legacy customers, a relatively 
small installed base compared with the potential future size of their domestic market, intense 
pressure to make a step-change improvement in value for money to unlock the Chinese mass 
market, low income levels of the majority of Chinese consumers encouraging focus on “good 
enough” or “sufficient” product performance on key attributes, shortage of capital invest and 
lack of experience in traditional R&D focused on higher performance and extended 
functionality (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). The study of Chinese firms is therefore a 
potentially fertile ground for examining what R&D and innovation processes can be deployed 
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deploy to convert these opportunities and demands into disruptive innovations. 
In seeking to answer this question we rely on inductive theory building using multiple 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). We chose this multiple case study methodology because it has 
proven particularly effective in developing new theory from consistent patterns within case 
data using replication logic in which each case serving to confirm (or disconfirm) the 
emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Martin, 2011). Moreover, multiple case studies are more 
likely to yield more generalized, robust, and parsimonious theory than single-case studies 
(Langley, 1999; Yin, 2003).  
 
Data Collection  
We relied on several data sources: observations, interviews, and archival data such as 
internal documents, annual reports, websites, and news articles in order to triangulate the data 
and so improve the accuracy of the picture emerging (Jick, 1979). We aimed to analyse a 
sufficient number of case studies and range of industries to be fairly confident that the results 
had some general applicability while limiting the sample so as to enable in-depth interviews 
within a tractable timescale. Based on these considerations we targeted completion of 12-15 
case studies. By the end of the research programme we were successful in conducting two 
rounds of interviews across 14 companies (detailed in Table 1). The first round of interviews 
was conducted between March 2010 and January 2011 and a second round between June 
2011 and September 2011. The second round of interviews complemented the first by asking 
follow-up and clarification questions. In some cases were we were able to secure interviews 
with multiple individuals; here we tried to gain perspectives from employees drawn from 
different levels in the corporate hierarchy or multiple business units, making a total of 35 
semi-structured interviews. We started the interviews by asking background questions such as 
the name of the informant, their role in their firm, and how many years have he/she worked 
with their firm. We encouraged informants to provide more details when their descriptions 
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were brief or when novel strands of narrative emerged (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Data collection stopped when theoretical saturation was reached (Strauss, 
1987). Interviews commonly lasted for between 30 minutes to two hours. Interview notes 
were written down immediately after each interview, normally within 24 hours.  
 
Data Analysis 
We used within-case and cross-case analyses following recommendations for multiple 
case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). We started by writing up 
individual cases that triangulated all of our data including observations, interviews, 
documents (Jick, 1979). We then conducted a cross-case analysis using replication logic 
across firms, treating each firm as a case. During the cross-case analysis we probed for 
alternative theoretical relationships and constructs that might fit the data better than our initial 
emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gilbert, 2005). Some of novel conceptual constructs and 
new theoretical relationships were revised or deleted if we found they did not replicate across 
the cases. Using replication logic, we stopped data analysis until we reached a strong match 
between emergent theory and the empirical data. 
 
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
Because traditional R&D processes in most organisations are generally not designed 
to create and deliver disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997) we conjectured that new 
innovation processes with a different modus operandi as well as different goals and 
performance criteria might need to be implemented in order to promote disruptive innovation. 
The first finding of our research is that leading Chinese companies have developed 
organisational routines to enable them to create and deliver on opportunities for disruptive 
innovation -- especially of the types of innovation, cost, application, and business model 
innovation found to be common in earlier research (Williamson & Yin, 2013). The 
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innovation routines that we found underpinning this disruptive innovation in our case studies 
included: industrialisation, parallel engineering, modularisation, and pragmatic decision-
making. During our investigations in China we came across many firms that did not adopt 
these models, but rather relied on low factor costs to offer the lowest possible prices in a 
“race to the bottom”. This suggests the firms that developed specific R&D and innovation 
routines to leverage abundant resources and low factor costs available in China in novel ways 
did so as a conscious strategic choice to try to gain advantage against competitors who also 
enjoyed similar access to abundant and low-cost resource pools. The ways in which these 
innovation routines enabled Chinese companies to deliver different types of disruptive 
innovations to the market are summarized in Table 1. This evidence led us to define the high-
level model of the antecedents of disruptive innovation depicted in Figure 1. In what follows 
we detail these relationships. 
 
Industrialising the R&D process 
Some Chinese firms we studied have enabled disruptive innovation by industrialising 
the R&D process by adopting an “assembly-line” approach analogous to that used in 
manufacturing. Huawei, for example, is a Chinese multinational networking and 
telecommunications equipment and services company headquartered in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong province. It was founded in 1987 as a distributor of imported telecoms products 
with an initial registered capital of merely USD 3,000. The company then disrupted the 
telecoms industry by offering telecommunications equipment to operators with adequate 
functionality and reliability that could be installed rapidly, customized easily to local 
requirements, and serviced remotely all at a lower price than its major competitors. This 
enabled it to become the largest telecommunications equipment maker in the world, having 
overtaken Ericsson in 2012 (Economist, 2012). Its products and services have been deployed 
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in more than 140 countries and it currently serves 45 of the world's 50 largest telecoms 
operators. 
In order to complete a complex R&D task, Huawei often finely divides the process 
down into a multitude of specific activities. It then assigns an engineer, or even a group of 
engineers, solely to that specific, mini-task. So that while a company like Apple might 
dedicate a total of 10 engineers to a particular R&D project, Huawei would assign a 100-
person team to the same opportunity. By increasing the total number of researchers and 
assigning each individual or small team working to a narrowly defined task within its “R&D 
assembly line”, Huawei can reduce the total time necessary to complete a project. This 
enables Huawei to deliver innovations much faster than competitors who deploy only a small 
team of researchers on each project where each individual must tackle a broader set of more 
complex, multifaceted tasks (Zhang, 2011). This is possible because of the large supply of 
qualified engineers available in China, allowing companies like Huawei to gain economies of 
scale and specialisation in R&D, not just in manufacturing. This industrialised R&D process 
is generally poorly suited to “traditional innovation” that typically focuses on developing 
completely new technologies or substantially pushing forward the boundaries of functionality. 
But it does appear to work well when the aim is to disrupt incumbents who have created 
performance overshoot by providing sufficient functionality with improved value for money, 
greater reliability, flexibility or shorter cycle times – goals that are often core to the extended 
concept of disruptive innovation that has emerged from the literature. 
WuXi AppTec, a pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and medical device outsourcing 
company with operations in both China and the United States, has introduced disruptive 
innovation to the drug discovery process using this industrialized approach. Its work on a 
new treatment for chronic hepatitis C provides a good example. As with most drugs, the 
development cycle involves discovery, pre-clinical and clinical trials, regulatory approval and 
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marketing. Rather than relying on a small team working in the laboratory with a few 
machines, however, WuXi AppTec began by dividing the R&D process into a series of eight 
steps, with dozens of people assigned to each step. The initial creation of the reactive 
intermediates required specialized staff, with at least Masters degrees and considerable 
research training. The other steps required “R&D workers” (graduates of trade colleges), 
from which WuXi AppTec hires thousands each year. Rather than relying on automation, 
(with the associated high capital costs and risk of bottlenecks), WuXi AppTec uses manual 
techniques that can be quickly scaled up or down as required to keep the project moving 
rapidly. Efficiency was increased by using SAP’s enterprise resource planning software 
adapted from a manufacturing assembly line to manage the innovation process. This highly 
industrialized approach has enabled WuXi AppTec to complete projects between two and 
five times faster than comparable projects using conventional approaches the company 
benchmarked in the United States. 
By industrialising R&D in these ways to leverage the huge pool of engineers and 
other staff available in China, therefore, Chinese companies are able to develop the products 
and processes necessary to exploit opportunities for cost, application and business model 
innovation at much lower levels of investment and more rapidly than using traditional R&D 
processes designed to develop technologies designed to innovate on the basis of improved 
functionality or more sophisticated products. Industrialized R&D processes therefore enable 
Chinese companies to bring products adequate to meet the basic functionality and reliability 
demanded by mainstream, mass-market consumers with a wider choice of incremental 
features, more customization, faster and at lower prices than competitors using traditional 
innovation processes are in a position to deliver.  This enables them to market innovations 
that while they are in some respects imitative, are also disruptive in the sense that they up-end 
conventional wisdom about the relevant bases of competition in an industry and undermine 
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the existing business models of incumbent firms. 
This analysis leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Industrialising the R&D processes can facilitate disruptive innovation in 
China by reducing the total time and cost required to develop a product that offers greater 
value for money to consumers by incorporating uniquely market-relevant features and/or 
performance and offering these to consumers sooner than incumbents and at lower prices.  
 
Parallel Processing in R&D 
We found that some leading Chinese firms such as Lenovo adopted a different 
approach to accelerating disruptive innovation, borrowing not from the concepts of assembly 
lines used in manufacturing, but from the idea of “parallel processing” commonly used in 
supercomputers. Lenovo is a Chinese multinational technology firm with headquarters in 
Beijing, China and Morrisville, North Carolina, United States. The company was founded in 
Beijing in 1984 as a reseller, distributor for foreign brands such as IBM. In 1990, Lenovo 
started to manufacture its own personal computers (PCs) and by 1997 became the market 
leader in China over international leading firms such as Dell, HP and IBM. In 2004, Lenovo 
made a strategic choice to expand abroad and bought IBM's PC business (including the brand 
ThinkPad) for USD 1.25 billion. The company then disrupted the global PC sector by 
supplying the IdeaPad computers, which target home customers, and the ThinkPad computers 
(many are simpler versions of the original ThinkPad computers), which target business 
customers at low price and became the world's second-largest personal computer vendor by 
unit sales (Gartner, 2013). 
Following their acquisition of IBM’s personal computer business back in late 2004, 
Lenovo adopted many of the R&D disciplines and procedures IBM had developed over 
decades of successful innovation. But Lenovo also modified the IBM R&D blueprint by 
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introducing a parallel-processing approach. Instead of treating R&D as a linear process, 
Lenovo began to create a new R&D process that allows various functions that are normally 
sequential steps to be conducted simultaneously. 
The Pearl River Piano Group – the world’s largest maker of pianos with 25% global 
market share, owner of the Ritmüller brand and supplier to Steinway & Sons, also applied the 
same approach to innovate in the manufacture of musical instruments. Creating a new piano 
requires the development of four key components: the resonance system, the keyboard, the 
pedal system, and the case. Western competitors, such as piano makers in Germany, develop 
designs sequentially using a team of two or three professionals working over a period of two 
years. We found that Pearl River, by contrast, deploys a simultaneous engineering approach. 
For its recent high-end, Kayserburg line of pianos, for example, Pearl River assembled a total 
team of 23 staff including: six designers; ten personnel seconded from all relevant divisions 
of the company from procurement to sales; two testers; and three computer engineers. A 
further 40 craftspeople were assigned to making prototypes of possible new designs. The 
project was completed in just five months, resulting in a line of ten new Kayserburg designs 
at a total cost of $1 million. The company estimates that incumbent competitors using 
traditional design processes and small teams would require an investment of around $10 
million over several years to compete a similar set of new designs. 
The concept of simultaneous engineering is certainly not new (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991), but in the Chinese disruptive innovators we studied it had been adopted more 
extensively than appears to be the case in most incumbent firms, involving more development 
stages and greater timing overlaps. Pushing this parallel processing in the innovation process 
beyond accepted limits clearly carries risks, not least because the information necessary to 
shape the next step maybe incomplete or unavailable when the tasks are undertaken in 
parallel. But for disruptions such as cost, application and business model innovation where 
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the underlying technology remains unchanged this risk is relatively small. Because the 
overall architecture of the tasks to be performed and the interfaces are already pre-defined by 
a standardised approach, it is not always necessary to work sequentially. Instead, much of the 
work can proceed in parallel relying on standardised interfaces to make sure the results of 
each task come together in a coherent whole. Within the context of many forms of innovation 
that are disruptive according to recent broader definitions in the literature even through they 
do not involve revolutionising the underlying product architecture nor redesigning the 
interfaces between stages of the innovation process, parallel processing can be efficacious. 
Based on this observation from our case research, therefore, we advance the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: Parallel processing in R&D can facilitate disruptive innovation in China by 
reducing the total time and cost required to develop a product that offers greater value for 
money to consumers by incorporating uniquely market-relevant features and/or performance 
and offering these to consumers sooner than incumbents and at lower prices. 
 
Modularising product development 
We observed that modularisation of the product development process (not only the 
more common technique of designing a modular product) was another important process tool 
used by Chinese firms to enable disruptive innovation – especially in helping them to test the 
market potential of cost, application and business model innovation ideas by launching them 
onto the market in rapid waves. This advantage is potentially significant because in 
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation rapid improvement of the performance of 
disruptive technology allowing it to attract new customers and gain economies of scale is key. 
In mobile handsets, starting as an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) or a 
distribution channel for leading brands, Chinese companies such as Tianyu Longtong and 
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Jinli Group, among others, have captured a high share of the mid- and lower-tier markets by 
breaking down the design process into separable modules, so that redesign focuses only one 
attribute at a time. By limiting the re-design to small increments in one aspect of the 
functionality, rather than waiting until they have a model that is more completely new, 
successive upgrades and new models of cheaper me-too phones with added features can be 
released into the market every few weeks. These me-too alternatives are labelled as shanzhai 
phones (after “shanzhai”: the mountain fortress where outlaws hide, hinting at their illegal 
nature). In 2012 shanzhai products ranked second in the Chinese mobile phone sector with 
16.1% market share. In some instances new shanzhai phones reach the market even ahead of 
market launch of the models of leading brands that inspired them! 
Modularisation of the product development process is key to the shanzhai 
manufacturers incredible speed to market. Many buy the core modules that form the heart of 
the phone from MTK, based in Taiwan. MTK, through its past experience in the DVD market 
has integrated the parts required for a mobile phone into a set of basic hardware modules.  It 
can also supply its customers with the software to knit these modules together, forming a 
platform capability of underpinning a wide range of alternative functions. Shanzhai phone 
manufacturers, therefore, simply need to purchase the relevant modules from MTK, 
commission a design firm to redesign particular features or attributes such as the exterior case 
and then undertake the final assembly of the handset. This means they can focus the efforts 
almost exclusively on managing the product development process to maximise the speed with 
which they can test new models in the market. The rapid “launch-test-improve” cycle of 
innovation is particularly well suited to cost, application and business model innovation.  
The use of modularization for Disruptive Innovation development has also been 
confirmed in other research (Brown & Hagel, 2005; Hang, Chen, & Subramian, 2010). 
Brown and Hagel (2005) explained that Chinese motorcycle manufacturers in Chongqing 
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adopt "localized modularization" for disruptive innovation - a loosely controlled, supplier-
driven approach that speeds up a company's time to market, cuts its costs, and enhances the 
quality of its products. Hang, Chen and Subramian (2010) indicated that Yadea, a Chinese 
electric bike maker, shifted to modular architecture, coupled with high volume, quickly 
brought down the price for mass-market consumption. These findings lead us to posit: 
Proposition 3: Modularising the product development process can facilitate disruptive 
innovation in China by reducing the total time and cost required to develop a product that 
offers greater value for money to consumers by incorporating multiple, uniquely market-
relevant features and/or performance and offering these to consumers sooner than incumbents 
and at lower prices.  
 
Pragmatic decision making in the R&D process 
The traditional decision making processes that have become embedded in many 
global corporations understandably reflect the demands mature markets for which they were 
developed. In these markets legacy customers are often cautious, while regulatory constraints 
and risk aversion all militate against the launch of new products or business models until 
these have been thoroughly researched and tested. Rules, regulations and  “standard operating 
procedures” originally designed for routine activities have permeated many large companies 
including the supposed crucible of creativity: R&D. Meanwhile the move away from 
traditional corporate hierarchies towards so-called “flat organisations” has necessitated 
extensive consensus building, involving key members of every department or team that might 
be impacted, before radical changes are decided upon and implemented. Such consensus 
building is generally time consuming because each different department has their own agenda 
in mind and is prone to the pursuit of local optimisation rather than taking the perspective of 
what is best for the entire organization. 
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An increasing number of large companies are coming to recognise these problems 
associated with highly structured and corporate consensus-driven R&D and innovation 
processes leading them to engineer a shift towards more decentralised models that enable 
more localised and rapid decision making. General Electric’s disruption of its own internal 
structure and processes is a good example (Immelt, Govindarajan, & Trimble, 2009). Hamel 
(2007) has gone even further suggesting that innovation will lead to competitive advantage 
primarily when it is based on a novel management principle that challenges some long-
standing orthodoxy and is part of an on-going programme of rapid-fire invention where 
progress compounds over time. 
Interestingly in our sample of Chinese firms we observed that their organisation 
structures tended to be more hierarchical than is the norm observed by researchers in Western 
companies (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). We found that in Chinese firms a single, senior individual 
often overlooked the entire R&D process and his or her word was proverbial “law”. Such 
dependence on the judgement of a single executive increases the risk that R&D efforts end up 
moving in a completely unproductive direction. But this hierarchical structure and decision 
making does speed up the process of initiating, developing and launching innovations. At the 
same time, we observed that the innovation processes adopted by Chinese companies 
provided extreme horizontal flexibility to marshal and re-combine resources from different 
departments and functions horizontally across the organisation behind a favoured idea. 
Whenever a problem arose in the R&D process the most common approach for Chinese 
companies is to call for an immediate meeting attended by the heads of relevant departments. 
A quick diagnosis was performed and solutions often swiftly decided upon, after which 
immediate action was taken by the participating party (in large part because of intense 
pressure from the vertical hierarchy on the entire group to deliver). This process might be 
dubbed “huddle-and-act”. 
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Chinese companies can also often afford to take decisions to back a potential 
innovation more quickly than firms in high-cost locations because even moderate market 
success will take them beyond their lower break-even levels. The economics of creating a 
new mobile phone again provides an instructive example from our case studies. For a 
company located in Europe or the USA, such as Nokia, such a project needs to cover an 
investment of millions of dollars before it becomes profitable. Each new innovation project 
therefore represents a significant decision for which the probability of success must be 
thoroughly assessed before proceeding.  
By focusing on a different set of disruptive cost, application and business model 
innovation opportunities, by contrast, we observed that Chinese firms were able to launch as 
many as 20 new models for the same total investment as their Western competitors. Each 
innovation therefore represented a small, rapid-fire bet. Only a small proportion of these bets 
needed to succeed in order to make the whole programme profitable so that each launch 
decision could be taken quickly even if the available information is incomplete, allowing 
Chinese phone makers to respond to rapidly changing consumer preferences and fashion 
trends. 
A combination of hierarchical vertical, but horizontally flexible organisational 
structures, low break-even points and a highly fluid home market with lighter regulation and 
less loyal customers more willing to experiment, therefore, has encouraged Chinese 
competitors to develop flexible R&D and decision making processes that can create new 
opportunities, especially for disruptive cost, application and business model innovation. 
Based on the above evidence, we advance the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: Pragmatic and rapid decision making in the R&D processes can facilitate 
potential disruptive innovation in China by reducing the total time and cost required to 
develop a product that offers greater value for money to consumers by incorporating uniquely 
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market-relevant features and/or performance and offering these to consumers sooner than 
incumbents and at lower prices and by facilitating the development and implementation of 
cost, application and business model innovations. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our multiple case study research suggests that new or unconventional R&D and 
innovation processes are important antecedents to the disruptive innovations previous 
research has identified as being prevalent in Chinese companies. In particular, moves to 
industrialise R&D processes, extend the use of parallel processing to more development 
stages with greater timing overlaps, modularise product development processes, and adopt 
pragmatic and rapid processes for R&D decisions, appear to underpin and facilitate disruptive 
innovation. These findings beg the question of whether developments in the approach of 
Chinese firms to re-engineering the process of innovation matter for competitors in the wider 
global market? We believe they do necessitate a re-think among incumbent competitors, 
especially in developed economies, for two key reasons. First and foremost, emerging 
markets, especially the BRIC (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China) and VISTA (i.e. Vietnam, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina) are becoming increasingly important as 
drivers of global demand. As the Economist magazine has pointed out, already by 2005 the 
combined GDP of emerging and developing economies had risen to above half of global 
GDP when measured at purchasing-power parity (The Economist, 2010). On average 
developing country markets are now also growing an order of magnitude faster than those in 
the developed world. The capabilities to succeed in emerging markets, therefore, will be 
decisive in the next round of global competition (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). Yet these 
capability requirements are often substantially at variance with those associated with success 
in a world where global demand had been dominated by consumers in developed markets 
   
 
 
24 
(Prahalad, 2004). Because a step-change in the price/performance ratio and value for money 
is usually required to unlock the mass market in developing markets, capabilities that enable 
the realisation of opportunities for disruptive cost, application, and business model innovation 
will often be critical to success. New types of R&D and innovation processes that can 
underpin these types of innovation will, therefore, be necessary to win a substantial share of 
future global growth opportunities. 
A second important shift in the global market stems from the fact that China’s 1.3 
billion people (including a potentially active labour force of 800 million) cannot move from 
economic isolation to become an integrated part of the world economy without a downward 
pressure on global labour rates. And that process, which began in 1978 when China started to 
open up to the world, still has a long way to go: there are at least 500 million Chinese still to 
move from low-productivity agriculture to be efficiently employed in manufacturing and 
services. That is even before we take account of another 1 billion that might make this 
transition in India and other developing countries over the next decades. While these shifts 
continue, and there is little reason to suppose they will stop, at the macro level downward 
pressure on wages will continue. These forces have led real income levels of a significant 
segment of the working population in the developed world to stall or even to decline 
(especially among less-skilled workers in the North America and Europe). Many also feel 
their job security is under threat. As a result, a substantial, and growing, market segment of 
consumers in the developed world have become acutely focused on seeking out the lowest 
prices and best “value for money”. At the same time, they want to maintain interest and 
excitement by being able to choose products they see as keeping up with new trends and are 
loath to restrict their choice of variety.  From our research it seems that Chinese firms are 
developing R&D and innovation processes that will improve their chances of delivering 
disruptive innovation that will enable them to prosper from this growing segment that 
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demands “every day low prices” and increased value for money for innovative products as 
well as commodities (Tan, 2011). In order for incumbents to compete as their existing profit 
engines based on ever-increasing functionality and product sophistication are disrupted by 
this shift in market demand and competition from China, they will need to rethink both how 
they identify opportunities for innovation and the capabilities needed to realise them. 
A successful response probably involves both a shift in mind-set and an extension and 
re-engineering of innovation capabilities. First, incumbents may need to reassess their 
exposure to disruptive innovation and broaden the focus of their innovation efforts to give 
greater weight to opportunities for cost, application and business model innovation relative to 
pure technological advancement. Second, to improve the likelihood of delivering these kinds 
of innovation, R&D and innovation processes may need to be re-engineered to create new 
processes that can run in parallel with established approaches. This re-engineering is likely to 
involve more industrialisation of some R&D processes, greater use of parallel processing in 
more development stages with greater timing overlaps, more modularisation of the 
development processes for products aimed at mainstream and value segments and the 
adoption of less process-bound and more pragmatic and rapid decision making in respect of 
R&D projects. 
In fact, our findings from case study evidence in China suggest that this kind of re-
engineering of the R&D processes may be critical to the implementation of what has been 
termed “reverse” innovation (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2012) or “Jugaad” innovation 
(Radjou, Prabhu, & Ahuja, 2012). This is because these kinds of innovation are unlikely to be 
delivered effectively and efficiently by R&D and innovation processes that were designed to 
support innovation focused on technological improvements, additional functionality or 
greater sophistication.  
Of course, given the relatively small sample size our results are preliminary. The 
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findings do suggest, however, that further research designed to understand the antecedents of 
disruptive innovation across a broader range companies in China as well as those 
headquartered in other countries where R&D and innovation processes may be being re-
engineered would be worthwhile. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The antecedents of innovation on the technological frontier or that focused the 
development of greater functionality have been extensively studied (Scott & Bruce, 1994; 
Tienne & Mallette, 2012). Existing research has also explored the pre-conditions under which 
disruptive innovation is likely to arise within an organization. There has been much less 
investigation, however, of the nature of the R&D and innovation processes that might 
facilitate disruptive innovation. At the same time, the literature has increasingly recognised 
that disruption can arise from innovation that is largely imitative in terms of base technology 
and functionality but instead challenges incumbents by introducing new value propositions 
and business models. These types of disruptive innovation include cost innovation, 
application innovation, and business model innovation. Viewed through this lens, it is evident 
that a significant amount of disruptive innovation has been coming from Chinese firms in 
recent years. An analysis of the antecedents of this disruptive innovation from China, 
therefore, promised to shed light on how the R&D and innovation processes adopted by a 
firm alter the probability of launching successful disruptive innovations as well as whether 
opportunities for disruptive innovations are discovered or created. 
Based on multiple case studies of Chinese firms we found that their adoption of new 
or somewhat unconventional R&D and innovation processes did seem to facilitate the 
realisation of various kinds of disruptive innovation. Specifically, the industrialisation of 
R&D processes, the extended use of parallel processing in more development stages with 
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greater timing overlaps, the design of modular product development processes, and the 
adoption of pragmatic and rapid processes for R&D decisions, did all appear to underpin and 
facilitate disruptive innovation in our sample of firms. 
From a theoretical standpoint our results suggest that in understanding the antecedents 
of disruptive innovation it is not sufficient to explain the preconditions that create a 
favourable environment for disruptive innovation to emerge, including: the characteristics of 
its human resource pool; its organizational culture; its resource allocation processes; and its 
organizational structure. It is also important to model another important link in the logic 
chain: the mechanisms by which the R&D and innovation processes firms choose to adopt 
facilitate (or impede) the successful emergence of disruptive innovations. 
This conclusion also has relevance to the long-standing debate on whether 
opportunities for disruptive innovation are discovered or created by entrepreneurs. Our 
findings show that the Chinese market undoubtedly shapes the kinds of innovations that are 
emerging there and throws up many opportunities for disruptive innovations. However, the 
fact that many disruptive innovations in China have their antecedents in new R&D, design 
and production processes that entrepreneurs have consciously put in place demonstrates the 
very significant role that the creation of opportunities for disruptive innovation (rather than 
solely discovering them) plays in stimulating such innovations. Realising opportunities for 
disruptive innovation seems to require very proactive initiatives by entrepreneurs, including 
the adoption of supportive R&D and innovation processes. These opportunities are not 
simply discovered in the sense that they arise independently of the actions of those 
discovering them. 
Our findings also have a number of managerial implications. First, they underline the 
need for managers need to be alert to the fact that disruptive innovation can stem from a 
much broader set of sources than breakthrough technologies alone. In particular, some of the 
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innovations that are potentially most disruptive to incumbents with legacy products, 
processes and assets have their antecedents in new processes for R&D, product design and 
production as well as in market conditions that encourage and facilitate the development of 
innovative business models. This argues for taking a broad view of where the opportunities 
and threats from disruptive innovation may emanate. It also suggests that when considering 
how resource allocation and organisation structure, culture, and incentives can be adjusted to 
increase the likelihood of successful disruptive innovation arising, managers need to assess 
how these variables influence broad spectrum of types of innovation, not just traditional R&D 
activities. 
 Second, our results suggest that there is a growing possibility that disruptive 
innovations will arise in emerging markets such as China. Emerging markets appear to 
provide a particularly fertile environment both for opportunities for disruptive innovation to 
arise and for this potential to be realised by proactive entrepreneurs. In part, this reflects that 
fact that innovative product designs and business models that offer a step-change 
improvement in value for money are required to unlock latent mass-market demand in these 
economies. It also reflects the need for innovation in R&D, design and production processes 
in order to benefit from local factor conditions such as the availability of low-cost, but less 
skilled labour, less legacy assets, and the presence of many first-time consumers with a desire 
for experimentation. Moreover, as global market growth is increasingly driven by consumers 
located in developing economies and the “value-for-money” segments in developed 
economies, this means that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, incumbents in the developed 
world may need to look to emerging economies such as China to find some of the keys to 
delivering the kinds of innovation that will allow their companies to thrive and prosper in the 
next round of global competition. In response, managers will need to find better ways to tap 
into the antecedents of disruptive innovation in emerging economies such as China. This will 
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probably require that R&D units in emerging markets be tasked with seeking out 
opportunities for disruptive innovation and realising them locally, rather than focusing on 
limited adaptation of imported product designs. An alternative approach may be to develop 
alliances with emerging market players in order to tap into local know-how and the 
environment conducive for disruptive innovation. This last approach might be particularly 
attractive to small- and medium-sized foreign companies that face financial, regulatory and 
knowledge barriers to commercialising potentially disruptive innovations at home. 
Third, our results suggest that incumbent firms exposed to disruptive innovation may 
need to re-engineer their existing R&D and innovation approaches to create new processes. 
This would involve adopting process changes such as industrialising R&D, pushing the 
boundaries of parallel processing, modularising product development and pragmatic and 
rapid decision making in the innovation cycle described in this paper. Even when these can 
run effectively in parallel with established procedures, however, the barrier to unlearning 
existing approaches to innovation may need to be overcome to achieve this kind of change.  
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Table 1: Case Studies of Disruptive Innovation from China 
 
R&D and production 
process innovations 
Disruptive Impact Case firms Results 
Industrialising the 
R&D process 
Providing adequate 
functionality, rapid installation, 
higher levels of customization, 
sooner than incumbents and at 
lower prices.  
Huawei 
 
 
 
 
 
Wuxi 
AppTech 
 
 
Yichen JCG 
Science & 
Technology 
Dev. Co 
 
Guangdong 
Cranes Corp. 
(1) Founded in 1987 as a 
distributor of imported telecoms 
products 
(2) Now the largest 
telecommunications equipment 
maker in the world 
(1) Founded in 2000 
(2) One of the largest open-
platforms for pharmaceutical 
R&D 
(1) Founded 1995 
(2) Networking (Ethernet and 
wireless) product manufacturer 
 
 
(1) Founded in 1961 
(2) Major manufacturer of 
cranes and port machinery 
Parallel processing in 
R&D 
Reducing the total time and cost 
required to develop a product 
that offers greater value for 
money to consumers. 
Lenovo 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearl River 
 
 
Mindray 
(1) Founded in 1984 as a 
reseller, distributor for foreign 
brands  
(2) Now the world's second-
largest personal computer 
vendor by unit sales 
(1) Founded in 1956 
(2) Now the world's largest 
piano maker 
(1) Founded in 1991 
(2) A leading developer and 
manufacturer of medical devices 
worldwide 
Modularising 
product development 
Reducing the total time and cost 
required to develop a product 
that offers greater value for 
money to consumers by 
speeding up the rate at which 
multiple aspects of the product 
can be improved.  
Tianyu 
  
Jinli Group 
 
 
 
 
SIM 
Technology 
Group 
 
 
 
Tencent 
 
 
Broad Group 
(1) Both started as an OEM or a 
distributor channel for leading 
brands 
(2) Shanzhai products by these 
and other firms are ranked 
second in the Chinese mobile 
phone sector with 16.1% market 
share in 2012 
(1) Listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 2005 
(2) Leading mobile 
communication and “Internet of 
Things” developer in China 
(1) Founded 1998 
(2) China’s leading social media 
and Internet portal 
(1) Founded 1988 
(2) Designer and manufacturer 
of non-electric air conditioning 
systems and modular, 
sustainable buildings with 
installations in over 80 countries 
 
 
 
Table
Pragmatic decision 
making in the R&D 
process  
Reducing the total time and cost 
required to develop a product 
that offers greater value for 
money to consumers by 
facilitating the development and 
implementation of cost, 
application and business model 
innovation.  
Tianyu 
 
Jinli Group 
 
 
 
 
 
Wide 
Industrial 
Group 
 
 
Alibaba 
Group 
(1) Both started as an OEM or a 
distributor channel for leading 
brands 
(2) Shanzhai products by these 
and other firms now ranked 
second in the Chinese mobile 
phone sector with 16.1% market 
share in 2012 
(1) Founded in 1997 
(2) Research, design and 
manufacture of commercial air 
conditioning 
 
(1) (1) Founded 1999 
(2) (2) China’s largest e-commerce 
company 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
R&D and production process innovations enabling potential disruptive innovation 
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Highlights: 
 We explore how new innovation processes act as antecedents for disruptive 
innovation 
 We use inductive theory-building based on a set of case studies of Chinese 
firms 
 China is an significant source of disruptive innovation 
 Novel R&D and production processes can foster disruptive innovation 
 Realising disruptive innovation opportunities requires proactive initiatives 
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